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BOOK REVIEWS
Consensual Government
By Alexander M. Bickel. New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1975. Pp. vii, 156. $10.00.

THE MORALITY OF CONSENT.

Reviewed by Ernest van den Haag*
When he died in his fiftieth year, Alexander Bickel left a body
of work that had already earned him the respect of his colleagues
and considerable prestige among the readers of journals of opinion.
His death came too early not just for his family and his many
friends: it also deprived the Republic of a most promising interpreter of its philosophy. The slim volume under review testifies-if
further proof were needed-to the magnitude of our loss.
Bickel was a moralist for whom the law was "the value of values
.. .the principal institution through which a society can assert its
values."' His was a morality of restraint that insisted on acknowledging the moral value of moralities he did not share and, therefore,
on using the law to restrict individual moral choice as little as compatible with the order needed to secure the possibility of making
choices. He despised zealots. Asked by Kingman Brewster, President of Yale University, to tell "what is happening to morality
today," Bickel charmingly rebuked him: "It threatens to engulf
us." He was distressed by the "armies of conscience and . . .
ideology" that "rode high . . . on the bench as well as off ' 3 and
'4
produced an "assault upon the legal order by moral imperatives."
For "our legal order cannot endure too rapid a pace of change in
moral conceptions .... [T]he legal order, after all, is an accomodation. It cannot sustain the continuous assault of moral imperatives . . . ." Further, Bickel insisted that "although [the legal
order is] subject to evolutionary change . . . its own stability is

itself a high moral value, in most circumstances the highest," and
"more important than any momentary objective." 5
Such convictions led Bickel to oppose "[t]he derogators of
*Adjunct Professor of Social Philosophy, New York University; Lecturer in Psychology
and Sociology, The New School for Social Research. M.A., State University of Iowa, 1942;
Ph.D., New York University, 1952.
1. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 5 (1975).
2. Id. at 119.
3. Id. at 121.
4. Id. at 120.
5. Id.
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procedure . . . and other anti-institutional forces."' He tells with

barely concealed horror of occasions "[w]hen a lawyer stood before
[the Supreme Court, then headed by Earl Warren] arguing his side
of a case on the basis of some legal doctrine or other, or making a
procedural point, or contending that the Constitution allocated
competence over a given issue to another branch of government than
the Supreme Court or to the states rather than the federal government, the chief justice would shake him off saying, 'Yes, yes, yes,
but-is it.

.

.right? Is it good?' "I Bickel was opposed to the replace-

ment of the law by the moral ideas or prejudices of the judiciary.
His Frankfurterian task-to defend the law against the judiciary's
attempt to use it as an instrument to enforce its moral ideas-was
hard and lonely. Nevertheless, he persisted in opposing "the armies
of conscience and ideology."
Bickel wanted to make the scope of the law comprehensive
enough to proclaim the norms that are consensually perceived to be
necessary to social life, yet to let individuals and groups pursue their
choices without being forced to conform altogether to majority views
or being strapped into judicial strait jackets. His work, and the
unifying theme of this posthumous collection of essays, very largely
consisted of elaborations of his answer to the question: how can we
define the province of constitutional interpretation so as to make
and keep our law effective with a maximum of consent and a minimum of force? His concern for the legal order on which freedom so
largely depends led Bickel to oppose the "legalitarian society"' produced when judicial imperalism absorbs or overwhelms nonjudicial
norm-giving institutions. I share Alexander Bickel's general outlook
and admire his lucid, precise, and nuanced articulation of it. Yet I
question some of his arguments and formulations.
For example, I share Bickel's belief in a broad although not
unlimited tolerance of moral values that do not conform to the
predominant values in society. On the other hand, I dispute Bickel's
view that tolerance is necessarily founded upon relativism.
Although stopping short of Justice Holmes's "logical exaggeration"-Holmes believed that no values could objectively be
proven-Bickel found it necessary to describe his own view9 as relativistic in preference to "[t]he alternative

. . .

the tyranny of some

of us over the others."' 0 Is relativism the alternative to tyranny?
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 121.
Id, at 120.
Id. at 8.
See id.at 3.
Id. at 4; see id.at 77.
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Dostoyevski thought, on the contrary, that it would lead to tyranny.
I think Bickel here confused tolerance as a psychological quality and
philosophical doubt or uncertainty, a sign of intelligence, with "relativism" as an assertion, dogmatic, if you will, about the nature of
the universe.
Considering some of the meanings of the word, one is forced to
conclude that relativism either is irrelevant to Bickel's argument or
is based on a logical mistake. "New York is farther from Los Angeles
than Washington" is a "relative" statement. It is also a "relative"
assertion that an object "weighs two pounds and is five inches long,"
or "is very hot." Indeed, all our measurements are relative to one
another, or to some postulated standard, and are therefore objective. Our values too are relative to one another, or to a standard:
surely in any system some values are more important and central,
others less. "More" or "less" are "relative." I know of no philosophy
that would deny this kind of "relativism."
Bickel certainly had more and different things in mind. Did he
mean that values must be explained as arising from specific cultural
and social processes? Whether such a cultural explanation is true
depends on what is meant by the term "explained" other than "associated with" or "produced by." Do we mean that cultural processes are merely necessary to explain a value system, or are they
also sufficient to produce it? What is included among "cultural
processes"? Even if it is true that values can be explained by cultural and social processes, the explanation of values would have no
bearing on their justification. The source of values is irrelevant to
the moral justification that concerned Bickel. (It goes without saying that legal, as distinguished from moral, validation can depend
on the origin of a rule.)
Bickel's relativism seemed concerned with denying the possibility of ultimately justifying moral values. It meant that values are
justifiable only, or mainly, within a culture. Laws, as Hans Kelsen
stressed,"I must be legally justifiable within a legal system. However
necessary, is such a justification sufficient? Moreover, is no moral
justification possible for the system as such? Thoroughgoing relativists say moral justification is not possible. Some even conclude that
each culture and its value system has an equal claim to value. This
last surely is a logical mistake: if we have no intercultural measurements that entitle us to assert the superiority of one culture over
another, neither can we claim that one is equal to the other. This is
11.

See generally H.

KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW

(M. Knight transl. 1970).
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because assertions of equality, like assertions of superiority, must
rest on the measurement we do not have. Bickel did not go that far.
Not even Holmes, although he denied the possibility of justifying
values within a culture, treated value systems as equal. Both
Holmes and Bickel were aware that our Constitution does not so
treat them. Each man preferred a particular value system, and both
included tolerance of diversity among their values.
It is not clear, however, how far Bickel intended his relativism
to go. Both Holmes and Bickel seem to have been convinced that
the nondemonstrability of terminal values entails their subjectivity.
This does not follow: although demonstrability entails objective
truth, objective truth need not entail and does not depend on demonstrability. That we cannot show that a black cat is in a dark
room does not prove that there is no truth to an assertion of the cat's
presence, even if the presence remains forever undemonstrable.
More relevantly here, the tolerant, consensual, and limited legal
system Bickel favored, and interpreted the Constitution to favor,
does not require a relativistic outlook. Nonrelativists need only include tolerance-for whatever reason-among the values that they
believe to be objective truths. They may insist on minimal restrictions because they are principled (and nonrelativist) libertarians, or
simply because they stress the difference between sin and
crime-the difference between morality and what they perceive to
require legal regulation. Finally, one may share Bickel's outlook on
law for the factual reason he gives, which makes his own moderate
relativism quite redundant: effective legal order must rest on the
consensual authority of the law, and such authority is available only
if the law's scope is restricted.
As Bickel would be the first to say, it matters how one arrives
at a shared conclusion; here it is important to point out that one
need not be a relativist to share Bickel's view on the appropriate
scope of the law, as I do.
On first amendment matters, I share most of Bickel's conclusions, though once more I arrive at them through reasoning he might
not have shared. As Bickel demonstrated in the Pentagon Papers
case,' 2 which he argued before the Supreme Court, the first amendment excludes prior restraint (censorship) unless grave and irreparable injury to important legitimate interests can be shown. Thus,
for instance, prior restraint is excluded, even if the documents to be
published are illegitimately procured. Here it may be interesting to
12.

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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ask why, if in the interest of not abridging the freedom of the press
a newspaper can print illegitimately procured documents, a court
cannot admit them as evidence in the interest of justice. Is freedom
of the press so much more important or so much more protected by
the Constitution than is doing justice? But let that go. Bickel did
not ask the question, though he shared Cardozo's negative attitude
toward the exclusionary rule.
Whereas the question of prior restraint is satisfactorily resolved
by court interpretations of the first amendment, the question of a
posteriori punishment for misuse of speech, in my view, is not.
Consider political uses of speech first. Here Bickel relied (with some
qualifications) on the Holmes test of gravity and proximity: only
clear and present danger permits even post factum penalization for
any use of first amendment freedoms. 3 In my opinion, the last forty
years have shown this test to be of limited usefulness. Total reliance
on it is too hazardous. Once a group has become a clear and present
danger to free institutions through its use of first amendment freedoms, judicial penalization will not stop it. At that stage penalties
become ineffective, whereas before the danger became imminent,
penalization could have stopped the expansion of the group, or the
acceptance of its doctrine. The rise of Nazism, largely by the use of
persuasion, illustrates this matter all too well. There may be a "tipping point." Once an antidemocratic doctrine, or one that favors
violence, has been spread far enough by persuasion so that
democratic institutions are in imminent danger, it is too late, it is
futile, to penalize those who spread the doctrine, however effective
it may have been to do so before the tipping point was reached. The
Holmes doctrine asks us to wait until the tipping point has been
passed, which is too late. The clear and present danger doctrine was
formulated prior to the worldwide expansion of totalitarian regimes.
In view of the totalitarian threat to free institutions, the doctrine
should now be modified. Advocacy of unlawful action (as distinguished from analysis or scholarly discussion) should itself be unlawful, even if an unlawful action is not imminent.
With respect to the use of the first amendment to protect obscenity, Bickel rejected the arguments of those who insist that obscenity publicly for sale can be regarded as a private affair that does
not intrude on those who refrain from purchasing it. When displayed and advertised, it obviously does intrude, just as the act of
an exhibitionist does. Is this intrusion permissible? Bickel felt that
13.

A.

BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT

64-67 (1975).
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the law should protect the "overwhelming majority of people
[endeavoring] to sustain the style and quality of life minimally
congenial to them." He came near to arguing that the law must
preserve traditionally shared values, even though "[i]t must avoid
tyrannical enforcement of supposed majority tastes."' 4 I
emphatically agree: while the law cannot create, it can preserve
shared values, and without these neither law nor civil society is
possible. The idea that people can pursue happiness by independently following widely disparate values is unrealistic. The founding
fathers never fully faced the problem because their political society
was more homogeneous than ours, and they believed that nature
would lead us all to pursue the same range of values. It does seem
now that nature needs the help of the legal system if even a broadly
defined range is not to be exceeded, and it cannot be exceeded
without eroding the social bond on which law and society itself must
rest.
When the law permits the subversion of the shared range of
values, people become impatient and clamor for tyrannical and excessive rules. Whenever the law did not protect what is "minimally
congenial" to people, this has been the reaction instead of the
boundless individual choice hoped for by doctrinaire libertarians.
Our courts have not interpreted the first amendment in the
absolutist sense favored by the late Justice Hugo Black. In effect,
they have held that all rights, including the right to free speech, are
limited by other rights, and by the rights of others. The courts,
however, have held that whatever protection is extended to speech
is extended to most other forms of expression. One may question
this interpretation. Did the framers really intend to cover anything
but cognitive exposition, or informational prose? Did they intend at
all to cover pictures, fiction, poetry, art, and other noncognitive
communications? If they did not, questions about obscenity could
be resolved by legislation not limited by the prohibition of abridgement of freedom of speech or of the press, except insofar as the
cognitive exposition of facts or ideas is concerned. Pornography is
not concerned with cognition. I do not know whether Bickel would
have agreed with this interpretation. I do know that he opposed the
tendency of the courts to impose on legislatures their views of what
is and is not legitimate-which courts often do under the most
transparent disguises and with little regard for constitutional or
legislative intent. Thus Bickel questioned the justification for the
14.

Id. at 75.
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imposition of the Supreme Court's "model statute" for the regulation of abortion. He found the "model statute. . . generally intelligent" but wondered, "[W]hat is the justification for its imposition? If this statute, why not one on proper grounds of divorce, or
on adoption of children?" He concluded, "The Court never said."' 5
Indeed, no serious constitutional reasoning can be found to justify
what Justice Byron White called an "extravagant exercise" of judicial power.'"
The Supreme Court's action with respect to the death penalty
is equally extravagant, particularly when it is noted that the framers were quite aware of and obviously rejected the reasoning that
led the Court to find imposition of the death penalty in certain
circumstances "cruel and unusual."" In the early days of the Republic the death penalty was imposed more capriciously than in
recent times. Moreover, the arguments used by the Court now do
not differ from those expounded by Cesare di Beccaria, whose Dei
delitti e delle pene (Of Crimes and Punishments, 1764) was published in French in 1766,18 with a commentary by Voltaire, and was
famous throughout the world at the time.
Let me turn back to the basic thrust of Bickel's work. He realized that the legal order can do no more than articulate the social
order and must change with it. The legal order can reflect social
changes, but the judiciary has neither the authority nor the capacity
to bring them about, or for that matter, to stop them. Attempts to
exceed its consensual authority merely discredit the judiciary.
Bickel was aware that lawbreaking, such as occurs in civil disobedience, may affect the social and, ultimately, the legal order. He
tried to keep civil disobedience within narrow bounds and to distinguish it carefully from revolutionary action, which in a democracy
must necessarily be antidemocratic. Within such narrow bounds
civil disobedience, unlike revolution, could be morally legitimate. I
agree, although I do not think Bickel sufficiently distinguished conscientious objection, which in principle can be legal, from civil disobedience, which, whether or not morally legitimate, can never be
legal when the disobeyed law is lawfully enacted and constitutional.
Furthermore, civil disobedience, however motivated, is a political
15.
16.
and Roe
17.

Id. at 27-28.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting from Doe v. Bolton
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
18. C. BECCARIA, DES DELITS Er DES PEINES (1965). See generally M. MAESTRO, CESARE
BECCARIA AND THE ORIGINS OF PENAL REFORM (1973); C. PHILLIPSON, THREE CRIMINAL LAW
REFORMERS: BECCARIA, BENTHAM. ROMILLY 3-106 (1970).
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act by definition; it is intended at least to persuade others or at most
to coerce them. Conscientious objection, on the other hand, need not
be a political act; it may be intended to affect the conduct of only
the objector.
We have known since Condorcet that majority decision may not
reflect majority wishes. 9 If democratic government is only a little
better than others in actualizing majority wishes, then it becomes
especially important that it remain a limited and consensual government. That will be its main virtue. Realizing this by instinct as
much as by theory, Bickel resisted the continuous attempts of the
judiciary to impose a "legalitarian society"-a government neither
limited nor consensual. His opposition to a legalitarian society is
nowhere more eloquently expressed than in his last book, The Morality of Consent.
19.

Condorcet's ideas have been worked out lately by Arrow and others. See, e.g., K.
93-96 (2d ed. 1963).

ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES

Ethical Problems of the Legal Profession
LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM.

By Monroe H. Freedman.

Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1975. Pp. xiii,
270. $12.50.
Reviewed by James F. Neal*
The advocate may allow his client to take the stand and give
perjurious testimony, at least in a criminal proceeding. By this resolution of the "perjury trilemma"-the conflict among the obligations of a lawyer to learn all relevant facts known to his client, to
hold his client's disclosures in strictest confidence, and to be candid
with the court'-Dean Freedman confronts the legal profession, the
American Bar Association, and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Most of the rest of this provocative book involves an attempt
to justify the author's conclusion as the only candid and workable
resolution of conflicting obligations piously imposed by the conventional wisdom of the legal profession on the criminal defense lawyer.
Dean Freedman begins to approach the perjury trilemma in the
first chapter by pointing out the values theoretically deemed important in an adversary system of justice. Among these values is respect
for individual dignity, as reflected by such constitutional provisions
as the privilege against self-incrimination and rights to due process,
counsel, and trial by jury. Another value is truth. Dean Freedman
could have added that the public has never understood these values
and their relative importance. Indeed, he could have explained that
even practicing lawyers and active trial judges have differing views
of the purpose of criminal trials. For example, the Watergate Special Prosecutor in 1973 sought to enjoin public hearings of the Ervin
Committee, or at least the televised public hearings, on the grounds
that such hearings could affect possible criminal trials and that
criminal trials are capable of informing the public of the abuses of
power known as Watergate. Judge Sirica also viewed the Watergate
''cover-up" trial as a means of getting at the truth.
A few of us in the Special Prosecutor's office, perhaps those
with more trial experience, recognized that a criminal proceeding is
a poor method of revealing the total truth. Indeed, the truth is not
* Member of the Tennessee Bar. Associate Special Prosecutor, Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 1973, 1974. Special Assistant to United States Attorney General, 1961-64. B.S.,
University of Wyoming, 1951; LL.B., Vanderbilt University, 1957; LL.M., Georgetown University, 1960.
I. M. FREEDMAN, LAwYERS' ETHics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 27 (1975).
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the purpose of such a proceeding any more than a fair and impartial
jury is the goal of an advocate involved in the jury selection process.
Perhaps the mythical originator of the adversary system believed
the total truth would emerge because each side would think it in its
interest to bring out the facts the other side decided not to disclose.
In practice, criminal proceedings do not lay bare the total truth. At
best the evidence produces different sanitized and truncated versions of some of the facts, and the fact finder must choose not
between the total truth and untruth but between the advocates'
versions of hypothetical past events. All of this is just a recognition
that the reality of past events cannot be recreated. Of course, much
truth does emerge in a trial, just as jurors generally try to be fair
and impartial, but a criminal trial has a much more modest goal
than the total truth. That goal is the determination of the guilt or
nonguilt of the individual on trial pursuant to a set of rules that
enhance the dignity and importance of the individual. In a free
society this is the legitimate interest of the state, and the adversary
system is admirably suited to vindicate this interest.
Dean Freedman recognizes both the purpose of the criminal
trial and the tools necessary to that end. The bedrock of the adversary system is the advocate, selected by the individual to present
his position, and the belief of the client that he may inform the
advocate of the facts in complete confidence. The author emphasizes the high value our system places on this confidentiality in his
account of the furor raised in a recent New York case. Two lawyers
were told by their client where he had hidden the bodies of victims
yet unknown to the police. The lawyers did not divulge to authorities or to the victims' parents the locations of bodies hidden by their
client. Even lawyers must remind themselves of the necessity of
total confidentiality between attorney and client when a situation
as stark as that one is revealed. Yet the New York lawyers certainly
acted with complete propriety in retaining their client's confidence.
Dean Freedman emphasizes the importance of confidentiality as he
works toward his solution of the perjury trilemma.
As Dean Freedman recognizes, one consideration for a lawyer
facing the perjury trilemma is his duty to advocate zealously his
client's position. Perhaps the weakest part of his book, however, is
the chapter in which Freedman explores the requirements of, and
emphasizes the need for, zealous advocacy. Here the author uses the
technique of destroying straw men. He states that James St. Clair,
the able advocate for Richard Nixon during the last period of
Nixon's presidency, was criticized for even representing Mr. Nixon.
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He then proceeds to lay waste to persons engaging in such criticism.
This reviewer never heard any person criticize Mr. St. Clair for
representing Mr. Nixon. Indeed, most informed citizens admired his
ability. The criticism Mr. St. Clair encountered was for failing to
insist on knowing all his client knew and for continuing to act and
take untenable positions based on lack of knowledge. Even this
criticism was muted, however, among experienced advocates, for
very few, if any, have not been misled and even deliberately deceived by clients at some time in their careers.
Zealous advocacy in the client's interest is indeed vital to the
adversary system, however. In criminal matters, the advocate frequently finds himself alone as the client's friends and associates run
for cover. Every experienced criminal lawyer at some time has been
told by a client about a friend of the client who has exculpatory
information, only to be informed by that friend that he does not
want to be called to testify because he would harm the defense.
One interesting aspect of zealous advocacy is mentioned by the
author, but it could stand further treatment. It is popular today for
some lawyers to contend they will not Pecome "hired guns"-that
they will only represent causes in which they believe. This writer
submits that this attitude is destructive of the adversary system.
An advocate is a hired gun. He is supposed to possess a sense of
relevancy, an ability to marshall facts, a capacity for objectivity,
and the power of a clear statement. He is not required to embrace
the position he advocates, only the principle that everyone is entitled to his day in court with his advocate. It is submitted that
abuses in some recent trials have resulted, in part, from lawyers
who have espoused causes, who have merged the roles of advocate
and client, and who view a trial as only one battle in a broader and
all-pervasive war.
The critical point of this book is reached when the author,
having emphasized the obligation to learn all the client knows, to
keep his client's confidence, and to advance his client's interest
zealously, poses the question: "Is it ever proper for a criminal defense lawyer to present perjured testimony?" '2 The perjury
trilemma, the author declares, presents conflicting obligations:
first, to learn all the client knows; secondly, to keep in strict confidence the client's disclosures; and thirdly, to be candid with the
court. The author translates this into "to know everything, to keep
it in confidence, and to reveal it to the court." 3 Before getting to the
2. id.
3. Id. at 28.
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author's resolution of a very difficult problem, one must note the
trick in translation. To be candid with the court does not mean to
tell all to the court. That is, being candid with the court does not
involve an obligation to tell the court what has been received in the
confidence of an attorney-client relationship. Thus the perjury
trilemma as postulated by Dean Freedman does not exist.
Nevertheless, a dilemma, at least in its secondary meaning of
a difficult or perplexing situation or problem, does exist. Moreover,
it is easy to agree that there is, as subsequent chapters in Freedman's book point out, difficulty in determining what one knows,
and difficulty in interrogating clients without suggesting selfserving and perhaps inaccurate testimony. It is also true that canons
and codes do not provide a satisfactory guide. Having admitted all
of that, this reviewer takes issue with the author's conclusion that
the advocate, to protect other important values such as confidentiality and zealous representation, should first try to talk the client
out of his intentions and, failing that, should put him on the stand
and allow him to commit perjury, then argue that perjury to the fact
finder. The author presents a situation in which the representation
has been agreed upon and the client has made full disclosure and
has advised the advocate of his intention to commit perjury. At this
point the lawyer cannot reveal disclosures made in confidence;
neither can he withdraw under circumstances that would leave the
client in a worse condition than when the representation was first
undertaken. The author is certainly correct when he contends that
the worst of all alternatives is simply to put the client on the stand
without questioning him but allowing him to narrate his testimony,
and then to refrain from arguing his testimony to the fact finder.
There is another way, however, and that is simply to avoid this
situation. A lawyer undertaking the representation in a criminal
proceeding should establish at the outset that he will not knowingly
permit perjured testimony to be used in the defense of the charge.
He can explain that he will attempt to learn all the facts both from
the client and from other sources and that experience indicates that
the lawyer's knowledge of all the facts is in the client's interest, even
if total knowledge results in nothing more than an attempt to prevent the prosecution from proving its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. Finally, he can advise the client that he will withdraw if the
client insists on taking the stand and committing perjury. With this
understanding, the advocate can withdraw during the course of the
representation, without injuring the other values stressed by the
author, if the client insists on giving untrue testimony.
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Admittedly, this solution could result in the client's attempting
to deceive the advocate. Moreover, the client could take the stand
and commit perjury without forewarning the lawyer. This writer
believes both risks are preferable to the author's solution. While
total truth may not be the ultimate goal in a criminal proceeding,
the legal profession does owe the public the obligation to expose as
much of the truth as is consistent with the preservation of other
values, and the profession certainly owes the public the duty to
refrain from actively participating in a fraud on the court. No witness has a right to lie, and no advocate has the duty to assist in a
lie. It is the obligation of the advocate to avoid a situation in which
one value, the confidence of the client, must be sacrificed to preserve another. If the client is advised of the condition on which any
confidential relationship will be accepted, he cannot complain if the
lawyer subsequently withdraws when the condition is violated.
The trial lawyer, and particularly the criminal defense lawyer,
lives in moral twilight. Nothing is ever clear-cut and every problem
engages one's sense of fairness in his perception of right and wrong.
Almost equaling the perjury trilemma in difficulty is the question
whether one should use personally embarrassing or worse information to destroy the credibility of a witness who has given truthful
but damaging testimony. The author discusses this old dilemma but
relates it to his solution of the perjury issue. Is there a difference,
he asks, between the lawyer who would allow his client to give
perjured testimony and the lawyer who would induce the jury to
disregard truthful testimony and thereby accept a distorted version
of reality? The question is disturbing, and one tends to resort to
canons and codes as an anodyne for the pain. To his credit the
author does not accept the easy answer that the cross-examiner is
merely bringing out the truth; he recognizes that the ultimate issue
of truth in the trial may arguably thereby be distorted. Of course,
Freedman does not provide an answer either.
Each lawyer must develop his own code for these problems, and
the young lawyer must realize they will be encountered daily. Our
adversary system is calculated to advance certain principles, among
which are the presumption of innocence, the corresponding right of
an accused to be acquitted unless the prosecution proves his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to an advocate who brings
out every relevant fact that might tend to deflect the prosecution
from its goal. No overriding value is damaged by the use of accurate
but embarrassing personal information, and the defense counsel
must go forward if he decides it is tactically wise to do so. His
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immediate tool is truth even if the ultimate result is a false impression. If one shies away from inflicting damage on a witness, his best
course is to specialize in estate planning.
For one who seeks to pursue an ethical course through his legal
career, no problem is more delicate than the interrogation of a client
and, indeed, other potential witnesses. If one cannot ethically permit perjured testimony to be adduced when the perjury is all the
client's creation, he cannot in the course of interrogation be an
active participant at the creation of the perjury. The author bores
in on this problem without letting the reader rest upon the pious
position that he, as counsel, would not knowingly use perjured testimony. How does one approach interrogation? The client does not
know the law and whether a change in one fact could be critical. An
example given is whether the client accused of murder with a knife
habitually carried the weapon involved or carried the weapon only
on the date of the event.4 Most clients faced with a murder charge
would accept either version they consider more helpful. May the
lawyer point out that one tends to show premeditation, and the
other is at least neutral? An experienced trial lawyer will recognize
how easy it is to suggest answers, particularly, as the author points
out, when one recognizes that the process of remembering is a process of reconstructing not equivalent to putting a stylus in the
groove of a record. Indeed, after several interrogations it may be
difficult to remember just what the client's statement was when he
was first interviewed.
A procedure that may avoid many ethical problems and pitfalls
is to delay interrogation of the client until the advocate investigates
the matter from other sources, including representatives of the prosecution. When the time comes for an extensive interview with the
client, the lawyer can not only give the warning mentioned earlier
regarding perjury, but he can also advise the client of some of the
facts arrayed against him and make some general statements of the
law involved. The client can then state his position in narrative
fashion without interruption. Some would insist that the client is
being given a meaningful opportunity to fabricate a story. At least
he does not have the cooperation of his lawyer. Moreover, the
client's narrative at this point should be reduced to writing: either
the client should submit his position in writing, or a secretary
should put it in memorandum form. Thereafter, the client should
be examined carefully on points that conflict with the information
4.

Id. at 71.
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from other sources. In the last analysis, the client has the right to
have his word accepted by his advocate unless it is patently and
demonstrably absurd.
The above procedure gives the client full opportunity to present
his position to his advocate. The advocate should not thereafter
accept facile changes in the narrative merely because in the course
of numerous conferences the client develops a more finely tuned
sense of relevancy. If the advocate is the hired gun with a brief to
present, he should be adequately armed. If he eschews the hired gun
role and embraces the cause, he may be tempted to contemplate
other means to "right a wrong." 5
This reviewer cannot conclude without disputing the author on
his comments with respect to the asserted persecution of Jimmy
Hoffa by former Attorney General Robert Kennedy. In properly
condemning prosecutions based on personal prejudice, the author
states that the Department of Justice under Kennedy brought more
prosecutions against Hoffa than there were civil rights cases in Mississippi. The truth is that only three prosecutions were brought
against Hoffa during the Kennedy years. Moreover, one of these was
a continuation and expansion of the so-called Sun Valley case that
was brought during the tenure of William Rogers, Attorney General
under President Eisenhower. Another of the three resulted from
directions of a federal judge to the Department of Justice to investigate wholesale efforts to tamper with the jury in the one case that
was solely and exclusively initiated by the Kennedy Department of
Justice. Dean Freedman's perception of Robert Kennedy's motives
is as faulty as his facts are inaccurate.
The reviewer's reaction to this book is to applaud the author for
posing and pursuing difficult questions and to recoil from some of
his suggested answers.
5. Several years ago the reviewer had the difficult task of prosecuting a lawyer for
obstruction of justice in connection with a famous case. That lawyer enjoyed a fine reputation
and may have been led to attempt to approach a juror because of what he came to view as
the improper tactics of the government. It has always appeared to the reviewer that this
lawyer merged to too great an extent the role of an advocate with that of his client.
6. M. FREEDMAN, LAwYERs' ETmics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 82 (1975).
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